. Looking at the election outcomes from 1946 to 1990 , Fiorina (1991 claims that there is a positive relationship between the incidence of divided government in U.S. states and professionalization in state legislatures, which is mediated by partisan differences among potential candidates for the state legislature. According to Fiorina (1994) Squire (1997) tried to redefine the causes of this relationship by directly estimating the effect of professionalization on the incidence of divided government from 1960 to 1990. He hypothesizes that if there is a positive 1) Actually Fiorina does not test the direct relationship between professionalization and divided government. Note that his dependent variable is the Democratic seat share. Therefore, unless all the governors are Republicans, more Democratic seat share does not necessarily mean more divided government. Stonecash and Agathangelou (1997) 2) In Figure 1 , I plot the trend of unified state governments for both all states and only nonsouthern states. As we see, the two lines show similar patterns, which implies that this trend is a general phenomenon, not restricted to certain regions. Fiorina suggests, when state legislatures started to be professionalized, it had different effects on potential candidates from different parties.
As legislative service became a full time occupation from a part-time job, more Democrats were willing to sacrifice their current jobs for legislative work because legislative service became better compensated and more highly regarded. However, we do not see much reason why this partisan difference should be sustained beyond the transition period as the legislative professionalization became institutionalized.
The findings in the above figures suggest that there is no partisan specific theory that explains the overall relationship between divided state government and state legislative professionalization. Therefore, to analyze the relationship beyond the transitional period, we need more general approaches.
Professionalization and Divided Government
How does professionalization impact voting decisions in state legislative elections? First, I claim that there is a positive correlation between divided government and legislative professionalization through the incumbency advantage. Legislative professionalization positively affects the incumbency advantage. As legislatures have become professionalized, legislators have had more resources that they can use for retaining their seats. For example, as they gain more specialized staff and operational budgets, they can provide more constituency service. Also, as they become better paid, they work full time and concentrate their effort on legislative work, which gives them a better reputation and leads to a higher evaluation from their constituency. 3) There is substantial literature on this strong positive relationship between legislative professionalization and increasing incumbency benefit (Weber, Tucker, and Brace, 1991; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993, 1995; Shan and Stonecash, 1994, Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 2000; Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman, 2000; Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell, 2004) . It is empirically observed that the more professionalized the legislature is, the more likely incumbents are reelected.
Furthermore, as the incumbency advantage grows, the probability that divided government is formed increases. Some scholars observe that the growing incumbency advantage in state legislative elections is positively correlated with increasing divided government in U.S. states (Ansolabehere et al., 1992; Fiorina, 1992; Born, 2000) . Since a strong incumbency effect encourages voters to cast their votes with more personal and local considerations in legislative elections, it is more likely that voters split their votes. Therefore, it is more likely 3) There are studies showing that public opinion does not always support more professionalized legislatures (Squire, 1993; Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo, 2008 Fortunately, in terms of state appropriations, the changed power 4) There are a couple of measures of governors' power (Dometrius, 1979; Beyle, 2003) . However, they are just assessing governors' power, not the power relative to the legislatures. relationship has been observed by Abney and Lauth (1998 For the split-ticket voting behavior, a balancing theory suggests that voters intentionally split their ballots in order to moderate the policy outcome (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 2003) .
The main assumption in this theory is that the final policy is determined by political bargaining between the executive and the legislature. As one of the testable hypotheses, this theory predicts that as the lopsided power relationship between the executive and legislature becomes balanced, voters are less likely to split their ballots so that a divided government is less likely to be created. (Erikson, 1988; Born 1994 Born , 2000 Alvarez and Shousen, 1993; Mattei and Howes, 2000) , so far, this institutional aspect of legislative professionalization on split-ticket voting has not received much attention. In this paper, I propose the existence of this so far ignored institutional effect of professionalization on divided government and suggest a significant negative effect of professionalization on divided government.
In sum, I theorize that legislative professionalization works in two different ways on the formation of divided government. Through the incumbency effect, it promotes personal votes which encourage split-ticket voting. At the same time, due to voters' policy concerns, it decreases split-ticket voting, which in turn decreases the incidence of divided government. Therefore, the overall effect of professionalization on divided government depends on whether voters are more concerned 6) In a balancing theory, given the policy points of the executive and a majority of the legislature, θ E and θ L , the final policy is determined by α θ E +(1-α) θ L , where α is the measure of power relationship between the executive and the legislature. Roughly speaking, as α becomes close to 1/2, this theory predicts the supporters for divided government shrink because the policy outcome under divided government also becomes close to 1/2. with policy outcomes than candidates' personal characteristics. That is, with a more professionalized legislature, when voters have more policy concerns, they are less likely to split their votes and intentionally decrease the probability of making a divided government.
On the other hand, when voters are more affected by the strong incumbency advantage, they are more likely to split their votes, and unintentionally it increases the chance of divided government.
Hypotheses
This paper redefines the connection between legislative professionalization and the probability of divided government by presenting a theoretical argument based on the comprehensive survey of existing studies. I
propose two different ways they are connected, indirectly and directly. Indirectly, professionalization increases the probability of the incidence of a divided government and directly, professionalization decreases it. First, indirectly legislative professionalization increases the incumbency advantage, and an increased incumbency effect in turn increases the probability that a divided government results. The literature on the incumbency advantage has shown the positive relationship between professionalization and the incumbency benefit.
Also, it has been observed that as elections become more candidate oriented, there are more split-ticket votes. That is, my first hypothesis is that increased incumbency advantage which is an indirect measure of legislative professionalization has a positive effect on divided government.
On the other hand, legislative professionalization implies that the legislative power in deciding state policies becomes balanced with the executive power. The balancing theory on divided government predicts that voters' considerations on state policies which are determined by collective bargaining between the executive and the legislature have a negative effect on the incidence of divided government as the lopsided power relationship between the executive and the legislature becomes balanced. Alternatively, we can understand this negative relationship in terms of the cost of divided government.
When the governor has a dominant power, divided government does not make much difference in the policy making process, which means that voters do not have to concern about the possible negative results of divided government. On the contrary, as the power becomes balanced, there is a higher cost for voters to split their votes. For example, divided government can result in a deadlock situation.
Therefore, voters are more cautious in electing a divided government.
That is, as state legislatures becomes professionalized, knowing the power relationship in the government, voters become less likely to split their votes, which leads to a decrease of divided government.
Therefore, my second hypothesis is that when one controls for the incumbency benefit, a higher level of legislative professionalization reduces voters' incentives to elect a divided government.
Discussion
Contrary to the previous observations on the increasing divided government in U.S. states, recent election results show that the increasing pattern of divided government has disappeared. The proportion of divided government has become stable in the 1990s and recently it seems the trend has been reversed. However, it does not mean the end of the "era of divided government." There are still substantial number of divided governments in U.S. states. It is more likely that divided government has been institutionalized in spite of the concerns about less efficiency and less responsive elections under divided governments (Thurber, 1991; Leyden and Borrelli, 1995; Edwards III et al., 1997; Norpoth, 2001) , and therefore, more attention is asked about the causes of it. In this paper, I suggest that divided government is both a "historical and procedural accident" as Sundquist (1988) claims and an intentional outcome by voters. In this paper I
showed that divided government is correlated differently to the increasing incumbency effect and voters' considerations on policy outcomes, both of which are connected to legislative professionalization. Also, my theory provides a possible explanation why Squire only finds a weak relationship between professionalization and divided government. Since professionalization has a dual effect on forming divided government, a positive effect through incumbency and a negative effect, unless separating those effects, it is possible that each effect is canceled out by each other. As my theory suggests, in order to capture correctly how professionalization works on the probability of divided government we need to control for the incumbency effect.
The main purpose of this paper is providing a theoretical understanding on legislative professionalization. 7) Specifically we are interested in the effect of legislative professionalization on divided government, and based on the extensive survey of existing literature we propose the dual effect of professionalization. Then the obvious next step should be testing the hypotheses and confirming the theoretical argument. However, currently we leave the job as a future research agenda. We could have found a couple of possible ways to test the hypotheses with existing election data, but they are questionable for different reasons. The reasoning is as following.
How could we test the relationship between professionalization and the divided government as presented in this paper? The first choice 7) What have caused the legislative professionalization and how it has developed differently among states are another research area (see e.g., Mooney, 1995; Rosenthal 1996; King 2000 Second, more importantly, the state-level analysis may not provide complete understanding of the dynamics of voters' incentives to elect a divided government. Obviously, divided government is formed when several conditions are met altogether. First, a majority voters should vote for a gubernatorial candidate from one party in a state and second, a majority of legislators from the other party should get a 8) One of the two major independent variables is a measure of state legislative professionalism. There are several measures available (e.g., Squire, 1997 Squire, , 2007 King, 2000 However, there are also questions raised against this variable. Most of all, the empirical analysis using this district level data is an indirect test of our argument on the relationship between professionalization and divided government. It takes into account voters' intention to build a divided government but it certainly does not measure the probability of having a divided government.
Therefore, in order to examine voters' conscious and unconscious intention to make divided government resulting from the professionalization in state legislatures, we need an individual level research, for which we do not currently have available data to use.
In addition to secure proper data to test our hypotheses, in order to validate our argument we need to confirm the relationship between This paper theoretically investigates the link between the U.S. state legislative professionalization and the incidence of divided government.
Morris P. Fiorina provides a hypothesis attributing the growth of divided government to state legislative professionalization, but Peverill Squire only finds a weak relationship between these two variables. I argue that the institutional effect of professionalization has not been captured correctly.
Including voter side decision making processes, I hypothesize that there are two different effects of professionalization on the divided government. First, legislative professionalization increases the incumbency advantage which encourages split ticket voting behavior and the occurrence of divided government. Second, based on a balancing theory, I propose that there is a negative institutional effect of legislative professionalization. Based on these hypotheses I propose that the incumbency benefit should be controlled for in order to capture the institutional effect of professionalization on voters' incentives to elect a divided government.
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